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洪传春. 林下经济核心利益相关者经典动态博弈分析[J]. 安徽工业大学学报社会科学版, 2017, 34(2): 3-6. DOI: 10.3969/j.issn.1671-9247.2017.02.001
引用本文: 洪传春. 林下经济核心利益相关者经典动态博弈分析[J]. 安徽工业大学学报社会科学版, 2017, 34(2): 3-6. DOI: 10.3969/j.issn.1671-9247.2017.02.001
HONG Chuan-chun. Classical Dynamic Game Analysis of the Core Stakeholders in the Forest Economy[J]. Journal of Anhui University of Technology(Social Sciences), 2017, 34(2): 3-6. DOI: 10.3969/j.issn.1671-9247.2017.02.001
Citation: HONG Chuan-chun. Classical Dynamic Game Analysis of the Core Stakeholders in the Forest Economy[J]. Journal of Anhui University of Technology(Social Sciences), 2017, 34(2): 3-6. DOI: 10.3969/j.issn.1671-9247.2017.02.001

林下经济核心利益相关者经典动态博弈分析

Classical Dynamic Game Analysis of the Core Stakeholders in the Forest Economy

  • 摘要: 借鉴利益相关者理论和博弈论的方法,研究政府、企业和农户三方在林下经济发展过程中的博弈均衡及其实现条件。结果表明,在达成政府支持、企业参与、农户发展这一理想均衡结果的条件中,最优均衡条件是农户独立发展且能获利。这就要求在发展林下经济时要因地制宜、因时制宜。基于偏好的差异,政府需要为达成一定的生态目标和社会目标而付出一定的经济成本。

     

    Abstract: Based on the theory of stakeholder and game theory, this paper studies the game equilibrium of government, enterprises and farmers in the forest economy and the conditions of their realization. Results show that in the condition of achieving the ideal equilibrium result of government support, enterprise participation and peasant household development, the optimal equilibrium condition is the independent development and profitability of the farmers. This requires local conditions and being timely in the development of the forest economy. Based on the difference of preference, the government needs to pay some economic cost to achieve certain ecological and social goals.

     

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