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李艳, 王付宇. 低碳经济下钢铁企业实施废钢逆向物流行为的博弈分析[J]. 安徽工业大学学报社会科学版, 2017, 34(3): 29-34. DOI: 10.3969/j.issn.1671-9247.2017.03.008
引用本文: 李艳, 王付宇. 低碳经济下钢铁企业实施废钢逆向物流行为的博弈分析[J]. 安徽工业大学学报社会科学版, 2017, 34(3): 29-34. DOI: 10.3969/j.issn.1671-9247.2017.03.008
LI Yan, WANG Fu-yu. The Game Analysis of Steel Enterprise Implementing Scrap Reverse Logistics under Low Carbon Economy[J]. Journal of Anhui University of Technology(Social Sciences), 2017, 34(3): 29-34. DOI: 10.3969/j.issn.1671-9247.2017.03.008
Citation: LI Yan, WANG Fu-yu. The Game Analysis of Steel Enterprise Implementing Scrap Reverse Logistics under Low Carbon Economy[J]. Journal of Anhui University of Technology(Social Sciences), 2017, 34(3): 29-34. DOI: 10.3969/j.issn.1671-9247.2017.03.008

低碳经济下钢铁企业实施废钢逆向物流行为的博弈分析

The Game Analysis of Steel Enterprise Implementing Scrap Reverse Logistics under Low Carbon Economy

  • 摘要: 运用进化博弈理论研究大型企业和中小型企业两类群体之间废钢逆向物流实施行为的博弈关系。通过对各自群体及系统的复制动态演化过程进行稳定性分析,得出了不同情况下的演化稳定策略,分析结果表明钢铁企业实施废钢逆向物流的效益和成本、政府对企业是否开展逆向物流的奖惩力度都直接影响了系统演化稳定策略的选择。立足于长远发展,"实施,实施"策略是双方的最佳选择。

     

    Abstract: Evolutionary game theory is used to study the game relation of implementation behavior betweenlarge steel enterprises group and medium-sized enterprise group in the paper.The evolutionary stable strategies in different situations are acquired by analyzing the stability of dynamic evolution process of each group and system. Game analysis result shows that the steel enterprises, benefit and cost to implement the scrap reverse logistics, rewards and punishments from governmentdirectly affect the choice of evolutionary stable strategy. Based on the long-term development, "implementation, implementation" strategy is the best choice for both players.

     

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